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Abstract
Received literature have shown that if competing networks are restricted
to linear and uniform pricing, high access charges can facilitate collusion; a
result that breaks down if we allow for non-linear and discriminatory pricing,
however. In this paper we add unbalanced calling pattern to the model and
show that this may restore the use of high access charges. High access charges
may make the ￿rms collude on high prices. Moreover, when allowing for entry,
we show that incumbents can pro￿tably charge high access prices as a device
to deter or soften entrants.
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11 Introduction
Telecom network charges typically involve discrimination against o⁄-net tra¢ c, and
mobile telephony is a case in point. What matters for how much a person pays for
a call to somebody else is often not the physical distance between the two mobile
phones involved, but whether they subscribe to the same mobile phone operator
or not. Arguably, there might be cost components associated with tra¢ c between
networks only, and then the observed pricing pattern may re￿ ect the underlying
costs. This answer is not satisfactory, however: a closer inspection reveals that by
far the most important cost determinant of a marginal call to another network is
the access fee (termination charge) charged by the receiving network, increasing the
￿ economic￿distance between subscribers of di⁄erent networks. From an industry
perspective access fees are not real costs, since the access fees paid by one ￿rm are
parts of other ￿rms￿revenues, and this give rise to another question: Why are the
access charges so high?1
Armstrong (1998) and La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) have suggested that access
charges are high because ￿rms want high prices, and high access charge makes
them charge high prices:2 In a model with linear and uniform pricing, high access
charges implies high perceived marginal costs and high prices, but the high costs are
then compensated for by correspondingly high access revenues. Consequently, high
access charges can be an instrument for collusive pricing. This is not a compelling
explanation in markets like the market for mobile telephony, however. La⁄ont, Rey
and Tirole (1998b) demonstrate that if the operators can discriminate between on-
net and o⁄-net tra¢ c and have access to two-part tari⁄s, high access fees can no
longer be used to facilitate high prices.3 On the contrary, high access charges tend
1The same argument applies to ordinary telephony: before the services were automatized,
the costs of ￿ producing￿ a call were an increasing function of the distance between the points
of origination and termination of the call, because long-distance calls had to pass more manual
switchboards. Today, however, practically all costs of producing telephone calls are ￿xed costs.
The downward trend in prices of international phone tra¢ c is a re￿ ection of this cost structure.
2For an exellent survey of the theory of access pricing and interconnection, see Armstrong
(2001).
3See also La⁄ont and Tirole (2000, Section 5.5).
2to reduce equilibrium pro￿ts, as the access charge makes the ￿rms distort consumer
prices with an implied welfare loss.4 With two-part tari⁄s this means that the
consumers are willing to pay a smaller ￿xed fee.5 In many Telecom markets, linear
and uniform prices are the exception rather than the rule. It thus remains an open
question why we do observe high access charges and large price di⁄erences between
on- and o⁄-net tra¢ c in such markets.
We propose an answer to this puzzle based on the interaction between three
di⁄erent features which we believe characterize the markets in question. The ￿rst is
the tari⁄-mediated network externalities that arises when ￿rms discriminate against
o⁄-net tra¢ c: Subscribing to a large network lowers the average price of calls. Tari⁄-
mediated network externalities are already present in La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole￿ s
(1998b) analysis and are not su¢ cient to facilitate collusive pricing on their own.
The second is the existence of exogenous switching costs: consumers have a rela-
tionship with one of the suppliers, and there are certain costs attached to switching
supplier. As shown by Klemperer (1987, 1995), such switching costs facilitate col-
lusive pricing, but with two-part tari⁄s and non-uniform pricing, switching costs
do not call for ine¢ cient pricing: Marginal prices (access charges inclusive) should
equal marginal costs, and the market power that arises should be used to increase
the ￿xed fee of the two-part tari⁄. Consequently, the existence of switching costs
alone is no reason to set high access charges.6
Third, despite the fact that mobile phone owners can reach millions of other
persons, they place their calls to a limited number of people, among which friends,
family and workmates comprise the bulk of the recipients. The notion of a calling
club captures the phenomenon that individuals do not place their calls randomly
across networks, but have a bias towards calling other members of their calling club
4In fact, recently Gans and King (2001) have shown that in this context access prices should
be subsidized, i.e., should be lower than marginal costs of terminating a call.
5In an attempt to restore the collusion e⁄ect from high access charges Dessein (2000) introduces
heterogeneity in volume and subscription demand. However, neither of these features are su¢ cient
to restore the result of high access charges in equilibrium. Moreover, Dessein (2000) does not allow
networks to charge di⁄erent prices for on-net and o⁄-net calls.
6See also Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2002).
3(their ￿ friends￿ ). Since these are persons that are called regularly, it is reasonable to
assume that their network location is known by all club members.
The combination of calling clubs and tari⁄-mediated network externalities works
as follows: with higher o⁄-net than on-net prices, members of the same calling
club would bene￿t from joining the same network, ceteris paribus. Once they have
coordinated on the same network, each member of the calling club has a preference
for remaining with that network, giving rise to similar e⁄ects as if the products
were horizontally di⁄erentiated (e.g. in the Hotelling sense). Switching to another
network will make it more expensive to reach one￿ s friends in the old network and by
that make it more expensive to make an average call, even if both networks charge
identical prices and have the same size (i.e. the same number of subscribers).7
Consequently, also this type of consumer lock-in will reduce competition, albeit
at a certain cost: as long as high access charges do not re￿ ect real costs, price
discrimination based on call termination is ine¢ cient and will reduce total surplus
compared to a situation in which ￿rms set all marginal prices at their marginal
costs. Clearly, if consumers are perfectly ￿ exible and the ￿rms￿products are perfect
substitutes, either ￿rm could poach all of the rival￿ s customers by lowering its o⁄-
net price to zero. The undercutting ￿rm would double its customers base and could
even charge a higher ￿xed fee from all consumers due to increased consumer surplus.
Since all consumers switch there is no need to worry about a de￿cit on access charges.
Therefore, in order to generate the equilibrium we are looking for, either the ￿rms￿
products must be di⁄erentiated in some sense, or some consumer in￿ exibility must
be assumed. This is the reason why we have incorporated exogenous switching costs
in our model.
We present two closely related models. In the ￿rst ￿ the duopoly model ￿ two
networks that are symmetric in costs and customer bases ￿rst jointly set a common
access charge and then simultaneously and independently o⁄er consumers two-part
7Apart for the literature on networks discussed above, our model also relate to the literature
on network compatibility (see for instance Katz and Shapiro (1985)). However, this literature is
more concerned with consumer expectations and the existence of multiple equilibria which is not
an issue here.
4tari⁄s, possibly discriminating on the basis of call termination. The population
of consumers ￿ belong￿to either network from an unmodelled initial period, and
they incur exogenous switching costs if they want to switch supplier.8 With access
charges above the marginal termination cost, ￿rms will price discriminate against
o⁄-net calls, implying that members of a calling club should choose to subscribe to
the same network. Moreover, if calling clubs are located in the same network, price
discrimination will tend to increase individual switching costs which may enable
￿rms to charge higher ￿xed fees. We demonstrate that there are indeed situations
in which the two ￿rms can increase their pro￿ts by setting access charges higher
than the true cost of access.
In the second model ￿ the entry model ￿ we expose the two duopolists of
the ￿rst model to an entry threat. It turns out that setting a high access charge
may deter entry, and it may also be bene￿cial if entry is not deterred: high access
charges makes the entrant softer. Interestingly, entry is positively related to the
level of exogenous switching costs, a result that is easiest to interpret in terms of
the Fudenberg-Tirole (1984) taxonomy of business strategies: high switching costs
make the incumbents ￿ fat cats.￿
The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains the duopoly model
and derives the main results from this model. In Section 3 we present and analyze
the entry model. In Section 4 we discuss our modelling choices and the robustness
of our results, while Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The duopoly model
Consider a market with two ￿rms or networks denoted i = 1;2. Each network shares
equally a unit mass of consumers from an unmodelled initial period. Each consumer
places one call.9 We assume that there are exogenous costs s attached to switching
8Although our analysis is couched in a switching cost framework, some of our results is robust
to alternative modes of competition. The switching costs in our model can be reinterpreted as the
transport cost in a Hotelling type di⁄erentiation model.
9Equivalently, each consumer places a unit mass of calls, distributed according to the description
below.
5supplier. s is uniformly distributed on [0;s] with density g(s) = 1
s and CDF G(s) =
s
s over the entire support.10 Hence, G(s) is the proportion of a ￿rm￿ s consumers
whose cost of switching to the other ￿rm￿ s product is less than or equal to s.11






2y2 if 0 ￿ y ￿ 1
1
2 if y > 1
(1)
This utility function yields rather simple linear demand, and the utility does not
depend on who is the recipient of the call.12 If the price of the call is p per unit, (1)





1 ￿ p if 0 ￿ p ￿ 1
0 if p > 1
(2)
and the maximum utility (gross of any ￿xed fees) from the call is given by the






2(1 ￿ p)2 if 0 ￿ p ￿ 1
0 if p > 1
(3)
We assume that the ￿rms have zero marginal costs and that they can discrimi-
nate between on-net and o⁄-net calls.13 The ￿rms jointly decide the marginal access
charge a and then independently and simultaneously o⁄er consumers two-part tar-
10Other distributions yield qualitatively similar results, as long as the distribution is smooth,
atomless and has a positive density at s = 0 (cf. Klemperer, 1987).
11The interpretation of s can either be the traditional switching cost interpretation (assuming
that the products are ex-ante homogeneous but ex-post di⁄erentiated) or the transportation cost
interpretation (with products being both ex-ante and ex-post di⁄erentiated, e.g. like in Hotelling
type di⁄erentiation models).
12This latter feature of the speci￿ed utility function helps us get rid of a lot of problems associated
with price discrimination based on consumer heterogeneity and customer base composition. See
Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2001) for an analysis of price discrimination based on customer base
composition.
13The setup is easily generalized to situations with symmetric constant marginal costs, and it is
not di¢ cult to encompass situations in which there are real costs of access as well.
6i⁄s.14 A tari⁄fk;p;qg consists of a ￿xed fee k, a marginal price p for calls terminated
in the originating network (internal/on-net price) and a price q for calls terminated
in the rival￿ s network (export/o⁄-net price).
Next, we assume that with probability ￿ the call is to a member of one￿ s calling
club, and with (1 ￿ ￿) the call is to an arbitrary person. For tractability, we will
assume that ￿ = 1
2:15 Moreover, the following assumptions are made about the
calling clubs:
A1. Members of the same calling club initially belong to the same network.
A2. There is no overlap between calling clubs.
A3. Members of the same calling club have identical exogenous switching
costs.
A4. Members of the same calling club do not coordinate their switching be-
havior.
The most obvious economic explanation of assumption A1 is perhaps that if it
has been common to discriminate against o⁄-net tra¢ c, friends have eventually co-
ordinated on the same network in order to save on calling expenditures16, but it
may also simply be because friends are more likely to have similar preferences and
therefore tend to subscribe to similar services.17 Assumptions A2 and A3 simpli-
￿es the technical analysis. Assumption A4 is essential: if friends can coordinate
their switching behavior, the existence of calling clubs does not a⁄ect the model.
14An alternative would be to assume that the ￿rms set these charges simultaneously and inde-
pendently. We would argue, however, that the two charges are not set independently, but rather
that the two ￿rms bargain over both access charges at once. Symmetry then makes them focus on
their joint interests.
15Most of our results go through with any ￿: However, some results require that ￿ is above a
certain critical value, this citical value being lower than 1
2: In our setting it seems natural that at
least 50% of all calls are to one￿ s own calling club, hence assuming ￿ = 1
2 is just a simpli￿cation.
16Having p < q will generate tari⁄-mediated network externalities and consumers have incentives
to sort when choosing their network: friends will coordinate on the same network in local calling
clubs. Complete sorting could happen when p < q e.g. if friends enter sequentially and in pairs
and that the ￿rms charge identical prices.
17Alternatively, friends may have acquired mobile phones at the same times by responding to
campaign o⁄ers by one of the networks.
7(Alternatively, we might assume that coordination is possible, but costly. If these
coordination costs are su¢ ciently large, the equilibrium would be as in the present
model.)18 To simplify discussion, in what follows we will assume that a calling club
consists of only two persons (subsequently called ￿ friends￿ ), but this is not restrictive
as long as each calling club has a negligible mass of consumers.
For a given tari⁄fk;p;qg the equilibrium utility of a representative consumer of
network i is given by
ui = ￿v(p)
| {z }
+(1 ￿ ￿)(xiv(p) + (1 ￿ xi)v(q))
| {z }
￿ k |{z} (4)
friends others ￿xed fee
where xi is ￿rm i￿ s market share:The corresponding pro￿t of ￿rm i is given by
￿i = xi (￿y(p)p + (1 ￿ ￿)(xiy(p)p + (1 ￿ x)y(q)(q ￿ a)) + k) + T(a;q
0) (5)
where T(a;q0) = (1 ￿ ￿)xi(1 ￿ xi)ay(q0) is the access revenues from the other net-
work￿ s consumers, when the other network has set export price q0.
We will, unless explicitly stated, restrict attention to cases in which s ￿ 1
2, i.e.
the the upper bound on the switching costs is not to high. (If this condition is
not satis￿ed, the two ￿rms will behave like perfect monopolists even without any
markup on access, cf. Gabrielsen and Vagstad, 2002). As indicated, our primary
interest is in whether it pays for the ￿rms to set a markup on access, i.e., a > 0.
Thus we have to compare the outcomes for di⁄erent values of a.
When a = 0 Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2002) have shown the following result
(which is a relatively straightforward extension to Klemperer (1987)):
Proposition 1 When a = 0, and s ￿ 1
2 there exist a unique pure strategy equilib-
rium involving












18Cherdron (2001) has a model that is similar in spirit to our duopoly model. However, he works
under the assumption that some members of each calling club has in￿nite switching costs while
the others have no switching costs. He allows them to coordinate, but coordination is no big deal
if some of the members cannot move.
8The intuition is straightforward: when a = 0 there are no reasons for the ￿rms to
set ine¢ cient marginal prices, hence p = q = 0 for both ￿rms, in order to maximize
social surplus. Competition only a⁄ects the ￿xed fees. As usual in switching costs
models, whether or not an equilibrium in pure strategies exists depends on the distri-
bution and size of the consumers￿switching costs (see Klemperer, 1987). Moreover,
when such an equilibrium exists, the equilibrium ￿xed fees will depend on the con-
sumers￿switching costs. When switching costs are high (i.e., when s ￿ 1
2) the ￿rms
are able to extract all consumers￿surplus through the ￿xed fees. For lower switching
costs (s < 1
2) competition ensures that consumers are left with a strictly positive
surplus. The uniform distribution of switching costs turns out to be su¢ cient to
secure the existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium in pure strategies.19
Next suppose a 2 (0;1). If an equilibrium in pure strategies exists, it must entail
p = 0 and q = a: That is, ￿rms will discriminate between on- and o⁄-net calls because
the latter have higher perceived costs. Moreover, this pricing creates tari⁄-mediated
network externalities that will work like a positive switching cost for each individual
consumer, who will hesitate to relocate away from his or her friends. Then we can
follow the reasoning in Klemperer (1987) to the conclusion that any pure-strategy
equilibrium must entail a ￿xed fee that extracts all consumer￿ s surplus. However,
for small access charges this proposed equilibrium is vulnerable to poaching. We
will show that for positive, but small values of a there are often no pure-strategy
equilibria. There will then be mixed-strategy equilibria, however, but these are
complicated to characterize even in a relatively simple model like the present one.20
Consequently, if a pure-strategy equilibrium exists we must have (each ￿rm having
a 50% mmarket share)





































19See Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2002) for details.
20See Shilony (1977) for an example of how to characterize mixed-strategy equilibria of a model
similar to the present one.
9This will constitute an equilibrium if no ￿rm can make a pro￿table deviation by
undercutting its rival.
There are basically two ways to undercut one￿ s rival: one either tries to poach
all of the rival￿ s customers, or one goes after only a fraction of the rival￿ s customers.
In the latter case, the undercutting ￿rm will attract customers with low exogenous
switching costs from the other ￿rm.
In principle, it may be more di¢ cult to attract the ￿rst of the rival￿ s customers
than later customers. Two e⁄ects are at play here: The ￿rst customers to switch
have low switching cost, while later switchers have higher switching costs but an
advantage of joining a larger network. A priori it is not clear which e⁄ect dominates.
The following Lemma establishes that the former e⁄ect dominates. (The result turns
out to apply to both the duopoly model of this section and the entry model of next.)
Lemma 1 In both models, in any equilibrium and for any optimal ways to deviate
from an equilibrium, if customers with a given exogenous switching cost s0 are willing
to switch, so are also all consumers with switching costs s < s0.
Proof. See the appendix.
The following two Lemmas describe the pro￿t-maximizing ways to follow each of
these strategies. First we consider the case in which a ￿rm poaches all of the rival￿ s
customers, and let ￿A(￿ s) denote a ￿rm￿ s pro￿t from such a deviation.
Lemma 2 When a > 0, poaching all involves p = 0; k = ￿A(￿ s) ￿ 1
2 ￿ ￿ s:
Proof. See the appendix.
This Lemma simply states that in order to poach all of your competitor￿ s cus-
tomers, it is both su¢ cient and necessary to o⁄er a mechanism that pays the switch-
ing cost for the customer with the highest possible switching cost ￿that is, s. Next,
we investigate whether it can be pro￿table to poach only a fraction of the rival￿ s
customers. Let ￿S(￿ s;a) denote a ￿rm￿ s pro￿t from deviating by poaching some of
the rival￿ s customers. Then we can show
Lemma 3 When a > 0, poaching some is pro￿table when 1
6 + 1
6a2 < ￿ s < 1
2 ￿ 1
32a2.
If ￿ s is in this interval, then the optimal poaching strategy involves p = q = 1
2(1￿x)a,
where x = x(￿ s;a) 2 (1
2;1).
10Proof. See the appendix.
This Lemma is more complicated. First, if ￿ s is outside the given interval, the
optimal market share of the poaching ￿rm is either 1 (if ￿ s is below the interval)
or 1
2 (if ￿ s is above the interval). In other words, if switching costs are low it is
optimal to poach all, and if switching costs are high it is never optimal to try to
poach any of the rival￿ s customers. Second, note that when it is optimal to poach
only a fraction of the rival￿ s customers, optimal undercutting entails equal on-net
and o⁄-net prices. At ￿rst glance this may seem surprising. The reason is that
customers come in pairs in this model. The virtue of having p = q is to have the last
two customers being equally di¢ cult to attract, and this consideration dominates
other e⁄ects. The expressions for x(￿ s;a) and ￿S(￿ s;a) are given in the appendix.
We are now ready to present the main results of this section.






Given the de￿nitions in Lemmas 2 and 3, Proposition 2 is obvious and therefore
stated without a proof. Its implications, however, deserves some comments, which
will be given below.
Proposition 3 For some values of ￿ s, there exist values of a 2 (0;1) denoted a￿ such
that i) there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium for a = a￿, and ii) ￿￿(a￿) > ￿￿(0).
Proof. See the appendix.
A perhaps more intriguing question is whether one would expect pro￿table
markup on access to be the rule or the exception. The answer is neither, as il-
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Figure 1: Pure strategy equilibria with a > 0:
On the vertical axis we have a 2 (0;1) and on the horizontal axis we have ￿ s 2 [0; 1
2]:
The rightmost curve in the ￿gure shows combinations of a and ￿ s such that the
two equilibria (with a = 0 and a > 0, respectively) yield the same pro￿t, i.e.
￿￿(a) = ￿￿(0). To the left of this curve, ￿￿(a) > ￿￿(0). The two other curves relate
optimal undercutting pro￿ts with ￿￿(a): The leftmost curve shows combinations of
a and ￿ s such that a ￿rm is indi⁄erent between its equilibrium pro￿t with a > 0
and poaching all of its rival￿ s customers, i.e. ￿￿(a) = ￿A(s). To the right of this
curve ￿￿(a) > ￿A(s). The intermediate curve shows combinations of a and ￿ s such
that ￿￿(a) = ￿S(s;a); i.e. that render the ￿rms indi⁄erent between earning the
equilibrium pro￿ts with a > 0 and poaching only a fraction of the rival￿ s customers.
Hence in the shaded area the parameters are such that a pure strategy equilibrium
exists, and at the same time the ￿rms earn more pro￿t than if they had rather set
a = 0: In other words, the shaded area represents instances of pro￿table markup on
access.
First we note that high values of ￿ s improves the prospects of reaching a stable
equilibrium, as usual. Second, for low values of a; ￿S(￿ s;a) > ￿A(￿ s), implying that for
such low values of a it is most tempting to poach only some of the rival￿ s customers.
For high values of a, the reverse is true i.e. ￿S(￿ s;a) < ￿A(￿ s) meaning that the
12relevant undercutting strategy is to poach all your rival￿ s customers.21 Finally, note
that while the value of a is irrelevant for equilibrium existence if ￿ s is su¢ ciently low
(no pure strategy equilibrium exists) or high (a pure-strategy equilibrium always
exists), there is a region inbetween for which existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium
depends on the value of a. It seems like higher values of a promotes the existence,
but the reverse can also be true. Finally, since ￿ s is a given parameter of the two
￿rms￿problem while a is a decision variable, we can ￿ maximimize out￿the latter,
thereby concluding that for ￿ s between (approx.) :3 and :5, a carefully designed
markup on access is pro￿table, while the opposite applies for ￿ s outside this interval.
To summarize this section, we have demonstrated that high access charges can
dampen competition by creating endogenous switching costs for people hesitant to
relocate away from their friends. Moreover, for some parameterizations of the model,
the bene￿t from reduced competition is larger than the losses stemming from loss
of e¢ ciency associated with marginal prices that are distorted away from their ￿rst
best level. In the next section we will point at another bene￿t from the high access
charges: they make entry more cumbersome.
3 The entry model
In this section there are two incumbent ￿rms i = 1;2 and one potential entrant
denoted by subscript e: As before we assume that each incumbent ￿rm has locked-in
one half of the unit mass of consumers with exogenous switching costs uniformly
distributed on (0; ￿ s): Thus the share of consumers with switching costs less than
or equal to s is x = G(s) = s
￿ s: The timing is as follows. First the incumbent
￿rms agree on an access price a; 0 ￿ a < 1: Then simultaneously each incumbent
￿rm o⁄ers contracts fpi;qi;kig and the entrant o⁄ers fpe;qe;keg: Finally consumers
choose where to buy from. To simplify the analysis we assume that there are no
￿xed costs of entry.22
21In the ￿gure the two curves merge for high values of a. Technically, for a higher than about
:9, the optimal way to poach some is to poach all.
22It is clear that the qualitative results hold also with non￿ zero costs of entry. Technically, the
only e⁄ect of a ￿xed cost of entry is to shift the entrant￿ s pro￿t function by a constant, thereby
133.1 The entrant￿ s problem
Assuming pe ￿ qe and pi ￿ qi and supposing that a share x of all consumers switches
to the entrant we can formulate the maximization problem of the entrant as follows:
￿e(a;s) = max
ke;pe;qe
fx[ke + ￿(1 ￿ pe)pe + (1 ￿ ￿)(x(1 ￿ pe)pe
+(1 ￿ x)y(qe)(qe ￿ a))] + Te(a;qi;x)g
s.t. ￿v(pi) + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1￿x
2 v(pi) + 1+x
2 v(qi)
￿
￿ ki + x￿ s
￿ ￿v(qe) + (1 ￿ ￿)(xv(pe) + (1 ￿ x)v(qe)) ￿ ke
(10)
￿v(qi) + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1￿x
2 v(pi) + 1+x
2 v(qi)
￿
￿ ki + x￿ s
￿ ￿v(pe) + (1 ￿ ￿)(xv(pe) + (1 ￿ x)v(qe)) ￿ ke
(11)
pe ￿ qe
where Te(a;qi;x) = (1￿￿)a(1￿qi)x(1￿x) are the termination revenues that accrue
to the entrant.23
Lemma 1 demonstrated that when the pair of customers with switching costs xs
are willing to switch (henceforth called the marginal pair of customers), so are all
consumers with lower switching costs. Constraint (10) in the program above secures
that one of the marginal pair of consumers will switch and (11) that his friend will
switch to the entrant￿ s network. Obviously, if on-net and o⁄-net prices are equal
(i.e. pi = qi and pe = qe) the two constraints collapse to one. To decide which of
them is binding when on-net prices are lower than o⁄-net prices suppose (10) binds
and (11) is slack. Then the di⁄erence between the two left-hand sides must be larger
than the di⁄erence between the two right-hand sides. That is,
v(pi) ￿ v(qi) > v(qe) ￿ v(pe) (12)
which always holds when pi < qi and pe < qe. Therefore, for pi ￿ qi and pe ￿ qe
constraint (10) will be binding and (11) will be slack, or both will collapse to the
making it easier to deter entry.
23With probability 1￿￿(= 1
2) the call is to an arbitrary person, the revenues from such a call is
a(1 ￿ qi), x is the probability that the call is terminated in the entrant￿ s network and (1 ￿ x) the
probability that the call is originated in one of the incumbents￿network.
14same condition. The intuition is that when on-net prices are lower than o⁄-net
prices it is more di¢ cult to attract the marginal consumer than his friend. The
reason is that once the marginal consumer has moved, his friend has nothing to gain
by staying at the incumbent ￿rm because he will get cheaper calls to his friend when
if he moves. Substituting for the indirect utility functions and assuming that (10)

















This constraint implicitly de￿nes ke as a function of x;a;ki; ￿ s and the marginal
prices of the ￿rms. It turns out to be more convenient to formulate the entrant￿ s
maximization problem as one of choosing x;pe and qe: Doing this we can write
￿e(a;s) = max
x;pe;qe
fx[ke + ￿(1 ￿ pe)pe + (1 ￿ ￿)(x(1 ￿ pe)pe































2 (1 ￿ qj) + x(1 ￿ qe)
￿
are the termination revenues
that accrues to each incumbent. (As with the entrant we have formulated the
maximization problem as one of choosing x instead of ki.)
3.3 Equilibrium in the entry model
Solving these two maximization problems enables us to give a full characterization
of the equilibrium.









ki = 11x￿ s ￿ 2xa


















2 + 7x￿ s ￿ 2￿ s
where the entrant￿ s equilibrium market share x is given by





2 ￿ 12￿ s +
p
144￿ s2 ￿ 40￿ sa2 + 5a4 ￿ 4a3
￿
Proof. See the appendix.
Whereas the incumbents set marginal prices equal to marginal costs, the entrant
equate the prices for on- and o⁄-net calls. This rather surprising result deserves
some comments.24 Why does the price structure di⁄er between the two? The key to
understand this puzzle is found in exploring the di⁄erent incentives the ￿rms have.
All ￿rms are concerned with e¢ ciency, and this consideration pulls toward pricing
according to perceived marginal costs. However, incumbents are concerned with
keeping customers whereas the entrant is concerned with attracting customers. As
customers come in pairs, we might expect the incumbents to price in a way that
make friends reluctant to split, whereas the entrant might be expected to price in a
way that make the two members of a pair equally di¢ cult to attract. This is exactly
what happens. By equating on- and o⁄-net prices the entrant make the friends
equally di¢ cult to attract, and this feature turns out to dominate the e¢ ciency
24Given that the two prices set by the entrant are equal, it is less of a surprise that the common
price is inbetween the marginal cost of internal and external calls. The general expression for the
entrant￿ s marginal prices is pe = qe = (1￿￿)(1￿x)a: From this we see that when the probability
of a call being to a friend increases or the entrant￿ s market share increases the marginal prices are
closer to zero and vice versa when ￿ is small or the entrant has a small market share.
16consideration pulling in the direction of setting p = 0 and q = a. In fact, if the
entrant chooses to price e¢ ciently, the e¢ ciency gain goes to the switchers, who get
a lower ￿xed fee in order to make the ￿rst in the pair switch. The incumbents, on
the other hand, have no such incentives, and stick to marginal cost pricing.







Proof. See the appendix.
It turns out to be hard to ￿nd analytical expressions for how the equilibrium
pro￿ts of the three ￿rms change as we vary the two underlying parameters a and ￿ s.
We will therefore study some examples in more detail.
3.4 Examples
In what follows we will ￿x the upper bound on the exogenous switching costs, ￿ s, in
order to isolate the e⁄ects of changing the other parameter a. this section we will








us ￿rst look at the equilibrium market share of the entrant. Figure 2 below plots













































Figure 2: Equilibrium market share of the entrant.
The lowest line represents ￿ s = 1
4; the middle line ￿ s = 1
3 and the upper line
is for ￿ s = 1
2: We see that the entrant￿ s market share is decreasing in the access
charge; a su¢ ciently high access charge may deter entry if switching costs are not
too high. Note also that the entrant￿ s market share is increasing in the switching
costs, meaning that higher switching costs makes entry more di¢ cult to deter. At
￿rst sight it may seem surprising that higher switching costs induces more entry.
The key to understand this is that high switching costs turn incumbents into ￿ fat
cats￿charging high ￿xed fees and thus creating leeway for the entrant to capture
a relatively large fraction of the consumers with the lowest switching costs (cf.
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984).
Similarly, Figure 3 below plots the entrant￿ s pro￿t as a function of access charge
for di⁄erent levels of switching costs.25 We have that ￿e(a;s) ￿ 0 when
25Clearly, if we add a ￿xed cost of entry, the entrant￿ s pro￿t would be reduced by the same




































Figure 3: The entrant￿ s pro￿t as a function of the access
charge.
The lowest line represents ￿ s = 1
4; the middle line ￿ s = 1
3 and the upper line is for
￿ s = 1
2: When a is low enough, entry will occur, and in this case the entrant￿ s pro￿t is
increasing in consumers￿switching costs. The intuition is as indicated above: when
entry occurs, higher switching costs make the incumbents charge high ￿xed fees,
resulting in higher market share and pro￿t for the entrant.
Then ￿nally, look at the incumbent￿ s pro￿t as a function of a. As noted above,
for su¢ ciently high a the entrant may be deterred. For such a high a we are back in
the equilibrium in the duopoly model where each incumbent earns ￿￿(a) = 1
4 ￿ 1
16a2:
For su¢ ciently high ￿ s this duopoly equilibrium is stable. In order to avoid having
to deal with situations involving mixed-strategy equilibria, we will restrict attention
19to the following two cases: ￿ s = 1
3 and ￿ s = 1
2.26
When ￿ s = 1
3 we know that when a ￿ 0:4926 the duopoly equilibria are stable (see
Proposition 3). Moreover, we have that when a ￿ 2 ￿ 2
3
p
3 = 0:84530 the entrant




pro￿ts are increasing in a; and at a = a ￿ 2 ￿ 2
3
p
3 the equilibrium switches to the
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Figure 4: Incumbents￿pro￿t as a function of a when ￿ s = 1
3:
For intermediate switching costs our model predicts high mark-up on access and
entry deterrence.
Finally, when ￿ s = 1
2 we know that all duopoly equilibria with a > 0 are stable, but
that absent the threat from entry, incumbents will prefer the duopoly equilibrium
with a = 0: However, no a ￿ 1 can deter entry (cf. Fig. 3), and the optimal entry
equilibrium for the incumbents is the one with a = 1: The incumbents agree on an
access charge that e⁄ectively disconnect the networks, in order to reduce entry to a
26When ￿ s = 1
4, the entry equilibrium has the normal properties, with the incumbent￿ s pro￿t
being increasing in a. However, when a is high enough, entry does not take place, and the resulting
duopoly has no pure-strategy equilibrium.
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Figure 5: Incumbents￿pro￿ts as a function of a when
￿ s = 1
2:
4 Concluding remarks
Previous literature have shown that high access charges between competing Tele-
com networks can be used as a device for facilitating collusion, but only as long
as attention is restricted to uniform, linear pricing: If ￿rms can o⁄er two-part tar-
i⁄s and can discriminate between on- and o⁄-net calls, high access charges are no
longer pro￿table; it will only induce ine¢ cient prices and thereby loss of revenues
for the networks. An apparent puzzle therefore is why networks typically charge a
substantial markup on access, leading to ine¢ cient prices of o⁄-net calls.
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that by introducing exogenous
switching costs in combination with local calling clubs, incentives to charge a markup
on access are restored. Higher o⁄-net than on-net prices gives consumers an incentive
to locate on the same network as friends. Once there, consumers will be loyal to this
network in so far as ￿for equal prices ￿there are switching costs associated with
relocating away from friends. For ￿rms, increased loyalty give room for higher prices
and thereby higher pro￿t. This must of course be balanced against the distortions
21costs of high export prices ￿a cost that tends to be born by the ￿rms if consumers are
relatively homogeneous and two-part tari⁄s can be used. In our duopoly model we
have shown that the bene￿ts from access markup may dominate the losses. Alas, the
opposite may also be true, perhaps suggesting that this cannot explain the almost
universal practice of charging a markup on access.
However, we have also identi￿ed an alternative motive for charging a markup
on access: The consumer lock-in associated with high access will make it harder for
entrants to get consumers sign up for their services ￿ high access charges may deter
or at least soften potential entrants to the market. In our entry model we ￿nd that
a markup on access is always pro￿table: the value of reduced or eliminated entry
always dominates the pro￿t loss stemming from less e¢ cient consumption. Clearly,
as an explanation of the observed practice this is more satisfactory.
We conclude with a comment about the relationship between the model presented
here and La⁄ont et al. (1998b). The fundamental di⁄erence between their model
and ours is that we assume the existence of local calling clubs where friends may
coordinate on the same network. We ￿nd this assumption especially compelling
when it comes to exploring equilibria where ￿rms discriminate against o⁄-net calls.
The existence of coordinated calling clubs tend to bias the calling pattern in favor
of on-net calls, a feature not present in La⁄ont et al (1998b). Whether consumers
are ￿ locked-in￿to a network with switching costs or by transportation costs (as in
La⁄ont et al.) this calling bias will increase the individual costs of switching supplier
and therefore support higher ￿xed fees. The simple reason is that when considering
to switch, a larger fraction of your calls will have to be o⁄-net calls, or reversely,
staying with your original network creates a high consumers￿surplus because a large
fraction of your calls are on-net calls at a low marginal price. As it turns out, this
feature may be su¢ cient to tilt the equilibrium in favor of high access charges and
discrimination based on call termination.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
22The proof is in two parts. First consider the duopoly model. Let RD(x) denote
the net gain in utility of a customer with switching costs x￿ s when he switches from
his present supplier i (who gives him zero net utility) to the undercutting opponent







(xv(pj) + (1 ￿ x)v(qj)) ￿ kj ￿ xs (16)






(v(pj) ￿ v(qj)) ￿ s < 0 (17)
since ￿ s ￿ 1
4 by assumption, v(p) ￿ v(q) ￿ 1
2.
Next consider the entry model. Let RE(x) denote the net gain in utility of a
customer with switching costs x￿ s who switches from one of the incumbents to the












































￿ ￿ s < 0 (19)




￿ s ￿ 1
4.
R0
D(x) < 0 and R0
E(x) < 0 means that in both models the net gains from
switching is decreasing with the amounts of switching, that is, the discouragement
that lies in the increased switching cost is stronger than the encouragement that
comes with the larger network. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2.
With a < 1 there are several ways to undercut. If poaching all, the undercutting
￿rm will set q = 0: (This eases the switching constraints without giving rise to
any access de￿cit, since there will eventually be no external calls.) Then the after
23switching utility of any of the poached customer equals v(0) ￿ k ￿ ￿ s. A su¢ cient
condition to make all switch is to make the pair with the highest switching costs
switch. That is, to have
v(0) ￿ k ￿ s ￿ 0 or k ￿ v(0) ￿ s =
1
2
￿ s ￿ ￿
A(￿ s) (20)




















In order to stop poaching all, the switching costs must be large enough. Reducing
the markup on access relaxes this constraint and thereby requires less. The intuition
is clear: high a reduces equilibrium pro￿t without a⁄ecting undercutting pro￿t.
Therefore, higher switching costs are needed to deter this form of undercutting. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3.
When a ￿rm tries to attract only a fraction of his competitor￿ s customers, the





. Assume that a share t = G(z) 2 (0;1)
of the consumers switch to the undercutting network, meaning that consumers with
switching costs less than or equal to z switch. The share t will depend on the











= 2x ￿ 1 , z = (2x ￿ 1)￿ s (22)

















2 (xv(p) + (1 ￿ x)v(q)) ￿ k ￿ z (23)
1
2v(p) + 1
2 (xv(p) + (1 ￿ x)v(q)) ￿ k ￿ z (24)
z = (2x ￿ 1)￿ s
where (23) secures that the consumer with switching cost of exactly z will switch,
and (24) that his friend will switch. Moreover, the access revenues can be written




24We will ￿rst show that optimal undercutting entails p = q: Suppose p = 0 and
q = a are part of a solution to this problem. Then it is easy to see that the only
relevant constraint is constraint (23). Suppose next that we change p and k but


































> 0 for p = 0
Hence the optimal undercutting p is positive. Its exact value (assuming that con-












p = 0 , p =
1
x + 2







































Hence it is clear that @￿
@q < 0 for all q and therefore that optimal undercutting cannot
involve q > p.
Next, suppose that optimal undercutting entails q < p. Then only constraint
(24) is relevant. Following the steps of the above analysis then reveals that optimal
undercutting involves q > p, a contradiction again. (The proof is omitted.) There
is only one remaining possibility: optimal undercutting must involve p = q.














s.t. v(p) ￿ k = z = ￿ s(2x ￿ 1)






(1 ￿ p)p ￿
1
2




2 ￿ ￿ s(2x ￿ 1)
￿￿
25Letting I(p;x) ￿ x
￿
(1 ￿ p)p ￿ 1
2(1 ￿ x)(a ￿ p)a + 1
2(1 ￿ p)2 ￿ ￿ s(2x ￿ 1)
￿
denote













= 0 , p =
1
2
(1 ￿ x)a 2 (0;a)
@2I
@p2 = ￿x < 0












1 ￿ 2￿ s(2x ￿ 1) ￿ a
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2 + 16￿ s ￿
p
13a4 ￿ 88￿ sa2 + 256￿ s2 ￿ 12a2
￿









2 + 16￿ s ￿
p


















For subsequent reference, substituting the solution for x into the expression for the
undercutting ￿rm￿ s pro￿t yields the following pro￿t expression:
￿





2 + 16￿ s ￿
p
13a4 ￿ 88￿ sa2 + 256￿ s2 ￿ 12a2
￿
￿
￿12a2 + 11a4 ￿ 56￿ sa2 + 128￿ s2 ￿ (8￿ s ￿ a2)
p
13a4 ￿ 88￿ sa2 + 256￿ s2 ￿ 12a2
a4
26￿
Proof of Proposition 3.
This result can be proved by an example. If e.g. ￿ s = :4, then it is easily veri￿ed
that a = a￿ = :5 yields a pure-strategy equilibrium with higher payo⁄than does the
equilibrium resulting from a = 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4.




















x(1 ￿ pe) +
1
2



















2 > 0, hence optimal pe > 0. Now, look at

















(1 ￿ qe) ￿
1
2
(1 ￿ x)(1 ￿ qe) +
1
2


















2 (1 ￿ a)
￿












< 0 () a <
1 ￿ qex
1 ￿ x
which holds as qe < 1: Hence, @￿e
@qe < 0 for all a 2 [0;1]. Consequently, it pays to
reduce qe, and then no equilibrium may involve pe < qe. Hence we have established
that pe = qe under the conditions in the proposition.
Next, consider the e⁄ect on an incumbent￿ s pro￿t in (15) of a marginal increase































(1 ￿ pi) +
1
2









































































(a ￿ qi) = 0
establishing qi = a as the unique solution (it is easily veri￿ed that @2￿i=@q2
i < 0).







ke + (1 ￿ pe)pe ￿
1
2
(1 ￿ x)(1 ￿ pe)a
￿



















4 (1 ￿ a)
2￿
































The ￿nal step in our derivation of an equilibrium consists in ￿nding the equilib-
rium ￿xed fees for the ￿rms. With the marginal prices from above, the problem of






ke + (1 ￿ pe)pe ￿
1
2
(1 ￿ x)a(a ￿ pe)
￿￿
s:t: ke = 1
2 (1 ￿ pe)
2 ￿ 1
2 + ki ￿ x￿ s
pe = 1
2 (1 ￿ x)a

















(1 ￿ x)a(a ￿ pe)
￿
(25)
s:t: pe = 1
2 (1 ￿ x)a













(1 ￿ a) + x(1 ￿ pe)
￿￿￿
s:t: ki = ke + 1
2 ￿ 1
2 (1 ￿ pe)
2 + x￿ s (26)
pe = 1
2 (1 ￿ x)a (27)


























￿ s = 0 (28)














2 + ki ￿ 2x￿ s = 0 (29)
Solving (26), (28) and (29) for x;ki;and ke (using (27)) we get





2 ￿ 12￿ s + ￿(a; ￿ s)
￿
ki = 11x￿ s ￿ 2xa


















2 + 7x￿ s ￿ 2￿ s
where ￿(a; ￿ s) =
p
144￿ s2 ￿ 40￿ sa2 + 5a4 ￿ 4a3
￿
29Proof of Proposition 5.
>From Proposition 4 we have that the equilibrium outcome of the entry model
can be described as follows:





2 ￿ 12￿ s + ￿(a; ￿ s)
￿
￿ 0





2 ￿ 12￿ s + ￿(a; ￿ s)
￿
￿
￿5a3 + 8a4 + 240￿ s2 ￿ 84￿ sa2 + (￿20￿ s ￿ a + 4a2)￿(a; ￿ s) + 12￿ sa
a4
￿e(a; ￿ s) = ￿
1
4







2 ￿ 28￿ s
￿
￿(a; ￿ s) + 11a
4 ￿ 108￿ sa
2 + 336￿ s
2￿
￿(a; ￿ s) =
p
144￿ s2 ￿ 40￿ sa2 + 5a4 ￿ 4a3 ￿ 0
First consider the entrant￿ s market share. The market share must be non-negative,
hence we must have that x(a; ￿ s) = 1
a2
￿
2a2 ￿ 12￿ s +
p
144￿ s2 ￿ 40￿ sa2 + 5a4 ￿ 4a3￿
￿
0: This holds when
2a
2 ￿ 12￿ s +
p
144￿ s2 ￿ 40￿ sa2 + 5a4 ￿ 4a3 ￿ 0
which can, after some steps of tedious calculus, be rewritten as
a ￿ 2 ￿ 2
p






















0 < 8￿ s
￿




30We see that a su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that a ￿ 9
10: For a 2 ( 9
10;1] the
right hand side inequality (30) above is strictly decreasing in ￿ s: Hence, if it holds
for ￿ s = 0 it will hold for every ￿ s 2 (0; 1
2]: When ￿ s = 0 the condition obviously holds,
hence the condition holds for every a 2 [0;1] and ￿ s 2 [0; 1
2]:
Next look at the e⁄ect of a marginal increase in consumer switching costs on the









144￿ s2 ￿ 40￿ sa2 + 5a4 ￿ 4a3 <





a < 4 () a <
9
5
which is always true, hence increased switching costs increases the market share of
the entrant. ￿
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